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Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector 
FRANCIS BLOCH 
GREQAM, Université de la Méditerranée and Warwick University 
AXEL GAUTIER * 
HEC, Université de Liège and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain 
Abstract 
In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: 
(1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent’s network for 
final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers 
mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant’s 
delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the 
incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is 
considered as endogenous. 
1 Introduction  
This paper concentrates on the ongoing liberalization process of the postal sector in the 
European Union. It focuses in the entry of new postal operators on the downstream 
segments of the postal market (the delivery of mails). Competition in the postal sector 
raises a major concern for the financing of the universal service obligations (USO) 
imposed on the incumbent operators. USO includes the requirement to serve all customers 
(universality/ubiquity), the imposition of a geographically uniform tariff for a bundle of 
products, obligations in term of service quality (frequency of delivery, accessibility of 
contact points), and constraints on prices. It is commonly accepted that universal service 
obligations are associated with large fixed costs for the universal service provider (USP).1  
For the moment, the universal service obligations are (partially) financed by monopoly 
profits in the reserved areas. As these reserved areas will disappear, so will the associated 
monopoly profits (or at least part of them). In this case, the future of USO is no longer 
guaranteed and the financing of the USO becomes a major concern for both the regulator 
                                                 
* Contact author. Axel Gautier, HEC-ULg, Bat B31, Boulevard du rectorat, 7, B4000 Liège, Belgium. E-
mail: agautier@ulg.ac.be. Axel Gautier is the winner of the Post-Doctoral Grant in Postal Economics offered 
by the Belgian Post. He gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the sponsor. The view expressed 
here does not necessarily reflect those of the Belgian Post. The authors appreciated the comments and the 
remarks from participants at the Fourth Conference on “Regulation, Competition and Universal Service in 
the Postal Sector” held at IDEI (Toulouse) in March 2006 and from an anonymous referee.  
1 Cazals et al (1997), Cremer et al (1997).  
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(or the State) and the USP. The extent of this problem will obviously depend on the scope 
of the USO and the importance of competition in the postal markets.  
Maintaining the USO in a competitive market is thus a source of tension. To overcome 
this potential problem, proposals have been made to limit the scope of the USO and/or to 
limit competition to the upstream segments of the market.2 Moreover, the welfare impact 
of entry of competitors on the postal markets is not clear-cut. For example, Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2006) provide examples where the impact on welfare of allowing downstream 
bypass is negative. Panzar (2005) shows that the development of both upstream and 
downstream competition is not in conflict with the pursuit of public policies (low prices, 
USO coverage) as long as piecemeal bypass (the possibility for mailers to buy access from 
a competitor) is not allowed. In his model, the development of E2E mail competition 
reduces the incumbent’s mail volume and therefore, the incumbent should charge a higher 
margin on its products to cover the fixed costs.  
This paper concentrates on the impact of the incumbent’s pricing behavior on the entry 
of the competitors on the postal market. A potential competitor of the incumbent postal 
operator has different entry strategies: it can either deliver its mails using the existing 
delivery network of the incumbent operator (downstream access) or it can deliver its mails 
using its own delivery network (downstream bypass). If the competitor chooses 
downstream access, it performs only the upstream operations (collection, sorting, 
transport) and uses the incumbent’s delivery network for which it pays an access price. If 
the competitor chooses downstream bypass, it performs all the upstream and downstream 
operations on its own.3 
In Sweden, CityMail chose the downstream bypass option and delivers mails with its 
own delivery network. However, CityMail has a limited geographical coverage. Sandd in 
the Netherlands has now a nationwide delivery network and achieves a market share of 
8%. In the UK, UK-Mail (and many others) offers E2E mail services but the mails 
collected by UK-Mails are ultimately delivered by the incumbent operator, Royal Mail 
(downstream access).  
This paper builds on the literature on efficient access pricing in the postal sector (Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 1992; De Donder, 2006; Billette de Villemeur et al 2007;and Laffont and 
Tirole, 1994, 2000). In the efficient access pricing approach, the incumbent’s stamp and 
access prices are derived by maximizing the total welfare while guaranteeing a non-
negative profit for the firms. If USO obligations are imposed (or if there are fixed costs in 
the delivery activity), the access price paid by the entrant to the incumbent operator is 
equal to the incumbent’s marginal cost of delivery plus a mark-up. This mark-up aims at 
covering part of the fixed costs associated with the incumbent’s USO. It can be 
decomposed into a “Ramsey term” and a “displacement term”. For each product, including 
access, the Ramsey term is inversely related to the product’s price elasticity. Products for 
which the demand is highly sensitive to prices are charged a lower mark-up than those who 
are relatively less price sensitive. The displacement term is the product of the incumbent’s 
margin on its E2E products and the displacement ratio which measures the substitutability 
between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s products. If the entrant attracts a large fraction 
of the incumbent’s customers (the displacement ratio is high), competition creates serious 
concerns for the USO financing. Therefore, the regulator sets a high access charge to levy 
                                                 
2 As in the US situation where the incumbent firm USPS maintains a monopoly position on the last mail 
delivery. 
3 Unlike Panzar (2005), we do not consider competitors that perform only downstream operations. 
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a large contribution to the USO financing from the entrant. Conversely, if the entrant offers 
innovative products, and attract few consumers from the incumbent but rather new 
consumers, its contribution to the USO financing will be lower.4  
This paper is closely related to the work by Billette de Villemeur et al (2007) on 
optimal pricing under bypass and access. Billette de Villemeur et al (2007) consider a 
more general and more detailed demand structure (allowing for two types of customers: 
E2E mail and workshared mail), and compute the optimal pricing rules under bypass and 
access. Our computation of optimal prices is directly inspired by their work. We view our 
paper as complementary to theirs: we provide a full welfare analysis of the choice of 
delivery method, and analyze in detail the effect of incumbent’s prices on the entry choice 
of the competitor, two aspects which are absent in Billette de Villemeur et al (2007), but 
turn out to be extremely important in practice.  
1.1 Overview of the results 
In this paper, we start by deriving the efficient access and stamp prices in the case where 
the entrant buys access to the incumbent’s delivery network, and in the case in which it 
bypasses and builds up its own delivery network. We start our analysis by considering that 
the incumbent’s stamp prices depend on the delivery region (non-uniform tariff). In the 
case of downstream access, the access price is the sum of delivery cost, a Ramsey term and 
a displacement term. Under bypass, there are two modifications in prices: (a) the tariff is 
rebalanced and the incumbent is relatively more aggressive in the urban market where it 
faces competition, and (b) because the USP loses access receipts, there is an overall 
increase of all its prices to cover the fixed costs associated with the USO. These results 
corroborate those of Billette de Villemeur et al (2007). 
Next, we compute the efficient delivery choice for the entrant. One needs to distinguish 
between the first best delivery method (which maximizes welfare) and the second best 
method (which minimizes delivery cost). On the basis of costs, the entrant should by-pass 
the incumbent as long as its marginal delivery cost is lower than the marginal delivery cost 
of the incumbent. However, taking into account the USO and the fact that the incumbent 
needs to cover the fixed cost of maintaining his delivery network, the first best delivery 
method involves access even when the entrant has a lower delivery cost. This result shows 
that an entrant who chooses his delivery method on the basis of costs will bypass for a 
range of parameters for which access is socially efficient. Hence, excess bypass can arise 
on the market, but excess access never occurs. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
bypass may not be the efficient delivery method when the delivery cost of the entrant is too 
low. In that case, competition may drive the profits of the incumbent below the cost of 
USO, hence lead the regulator to prefer access.  
We then consider the problem faced by a regulator who cannot choose the delivery 
method of the entrant, and must take into account the entrant’s incentive as a new 
constraint to his maximization problem. We then show that the regulator’s choice will be 
aligned with delivery cost minimization: the regulator promotes access when the incumbent 
has a lower delivery cost, and bypass when the entrant has a lower delivery cost.  
                                                 
4 Displacement ratios are likely to be high in the postal sector. For example De Donder et al (2006) calibrate 
a model with displacement ratios of 0.75 and 0.9, meaning that three quarter (or 9 over 10) of the mails 
treated by the competitors are displaced from the incumbent.  
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When a uniform tariff is imposed on the USP, the incumbent postal operator has less 
freedom to set prices and it therefore has an impact on the entry strategy of the competitor. 
As urban mail price increases, the entrant is able to capture a larger fraction of the urban 
mail demand with a given price. In other words, the displacement ratio is higher. As a 
consequence, the efficient access price increases which makes bypass more attractive for 
the entrant. Then, inducing the efficient choice of access requires more distortion in the 
prices than in the case of non-uniform tariff. This means that the cost in terms of welfare of 
having an efficient delivery method is higher.  
We also consider a situation of incomplete information, when the regulator and the 
USP only know the prior distribution of the entrant’s delivery costs but not its realization. 
This uncertainty in costs translates into an uncertainty in the choice of a delivery method. 
The probability of entry with bypass is endogenous and it depends on the access and stamp 
prices.5 The regulator then faces a trade-off between promoting efficiency, that is, reducing 
the probability of bypass, which requires a low access price and USO financing which 
instead requires a high access price. We show that uncertainty on the entrant’s delivery 
cost could induce the entrant to bypass with a positive probability, even if it is not ex-post 
efficient.  
Our approach differs from the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) which also 
takes the market structure as endogenous. In the ECPR approach (Armstrong, 2001, for 
example), it is efficient to have one producer serving the entire market segment. The ECPR 
pricing rule is then designed to select the most efficient producer. By setting the access 
price equal to the incumbent’s opportunity cost, that is, its retail price minus its cost, the 
ECPR gives the right incentive to the entrants. They enter the market only if they are more 
efficient than the incumbent operator. In our approach, the prices are not designed to select 
the most efficient producer but to maximize the welfare taking into account that the 
regulator does not control the choice of the delivery method by the entrant.6 
The contribution of this paper is paper to analyze the impact of pricing on the entry 
strategy of the competitor, that is, how prices should be adapted to take into account their 
impact on the entry behavior of the competitors. By doing so, we neglect other issues like 
the reform of the USO. Clearly, relaxing some of the USO constraints is another possible 
way to overcome the problem of USO financing in a competitive market (see Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 2006).  
2 Model 
There are two postal operators on the market: an incumbent postal operator – we call it 
firm 1 – and an entrant – firm 2. By assumption, USO are imposed on firm 1 only and the 
regulatory regime is an asymmetric one: firm 1 is fully regulated while firm 2 is not. 
However, we will assume that firm 2 behaves competitively and prices mails at marginal 
cost.  
                                                 
5 This part of the paper is closely related to Dam et al (2007) who develop Ramsey pricing formulas that 
apply when the entry on the market is endogenous. 
6 ECPR and efficient prices will only coincide in exceptional circumstances. See for example Laffont and 
Tirole (2000), Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996). 
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Mails are delivered in two delivery zones: a high density region (urban) and a low 
density region (rural). Delivery costs depend on the population density and differ in the 
two regions.  
Each postal operator offers end-to-end (E2E) mails to consumers. Firm 1 delivers mail 
to both regions. This ubiquity constraint is part of the USO imposed on the incumbent. 
Firm 2 serves only the most profitable, urban, region. In the sequel, we use indices i=1,2 to 
refer to firms and exponents k=u,r refer to delivery zones. The mail products of the two 
firms are differentiated. For example, the incumbent operator offers J+1 E2E mails to the 
customers while the entrant offers mail services with a lower frequency of delivery.7 
Customers view the two products as imperfect substitutes. Moreover, we consider that the 
degree of product differentiation is not affected by the method chosen for delivery.  
There are two types of costs associated with the production of E2E mails: an upstream 
and a downstream (delivery) cost. We represent by ci the unit cost of all the upstream 
operations (collection, sorting, transport, …) for firm i=1,2. This upstream cost is 
independent of the delivery region. There is a constant unit cost of kd1  per mail delivered 
in region k by firm 1. Delivery costs are higher in the rural region: ur dd 11 > . For the 
entrant, the unit cost of delivering one mail in the urban region is ud2 . The entrant can 
avoid this delivery cost by buying access to the delivery network of firm 1. In this case, it 
pays a per-unit access charge denoted by uα  to firm 1 and firm 1 supports the delivery cost 
ud1 . In addition to these costs, the USO results in a fixed cost for the USP denoted by F.  
The net surplus of a representative consumer who sends kx1  mails to zone k with the 
incumbent and ux2  mails to the urban zone with the entrant is:  
 
uurruuuru xpxpxpxxxU 221111211 ),,( −−−  
 
where the kip are the prices charged by firm i for their E2E mails delivered in zone k.  
The maximization of this surplus function gives the demand for each type of mail kix . 
We will make the following assumptions on the demand functions:  
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Part 1 means that consumers give a positive value to the ubiquity of the service offered 
by the USP. Urban and rural mails offered by firm 1 are thus complements. In addition, the 
                                                 
7 Sandd and CityMail deliver letters twice a week. Most of the mail providers that choose access offer a day 
definite mail delivery, 2 or 3 days after the mail collection. 
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demand functions satisfy the standard following properties: 0<∂
∂
k
i
k
i
p
x , 0>∂
∂
u
j
u
i
p
x  and 
u
j
u
i
u
j
u
i
p
x
p
x
∂
∂≥∂
∂ . 
In the sequel, we use elasticities in the pricing formulas. These elasticities are defined 
as follows: 
 
DEFINITIONS:  
 
1. The direct price elasticity (in absolute value) of a product sold by firm i in region k is:  
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2. The cross price elasticity of a product sold by firm i on the urban market is, for i,j=1,2:  
u
i
u
j
u
j
u
iuu
i x
p
p
x
∂
∂=η . 
3. The intra-brand price elasticities for firm 1 are: u
r
r
u
ur
x
p
p
x
1
1
1
1
1 ∂
∂=η  and r
u
u
r
ru
x
p
p
x
1
1
1
1
1 ∂
∂=η .  
Consistent with our assumptions, we have positive cross price elasticities and negative 
intra-brand price elasticities.  
The total welfare is the sum of the consumer’s and producers’ surplus:  
 
FxddcxdcxdcxxxUW uuurruuuru −−++−+−+−= 2212111111211 ))1(()()(),,( θθ  
 
where θ  is a dummy variable that has a value of one if firm 2 chooses to buy access to 
deliver its mails and equals zero if it chooses bypass. The aim of the regulator is to set the 
stamp prices up1 , 
rp1  and the access price 
uα  in order to maximize the total welfare W. We 
will consider sequentially two cases. In the first one, the stamp price for mails to the urban 
and the rural area can be different. In the second one, a geographically uniform tariff is 
imposed: ru ppp 111 == .  
Firm 2 behaves as a competitive fringe. The competitive fringe assumption means that 
its product is sold at marginal cost. Since this cost depends on the delivery method, the 
stamp price charged by firm 2 is for its urban mail is:  
 
uu cp α+= 22  if firm 2 chooses access, 
uu dcp 222 +=  if firm 2 chooses bypass. 
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With this marginal cost pricing rule, the profit of firm 2 is always equal to zero. We 
assume that firm 2 chooses the delivery technology with the lowest cost, that is access if 
uu d2≤α  and bypass otherwise.8 
3 Non-uniform pricing. 
In this section, we derive the welfare maximizing prices when the regulator can set 
different stamp prices for mails delivered in the urban and the rural regions. For 
convenience, the technical analysis is relegated to the appendix. 
3.1 Access  
Suppose that firm 2 uses firm 1’s delivery network for which it pays an access fee of uα  
per mail distributed. If firm 2 chooses access, the welfare is:  
 
FxdcxdcxdcxxxUW uurruuurua −+−+−+−= 212111111211 )()()(),,(  
 
The regulator selects the prices that maximize welfare and that guarantee to firm 1 a 
non-negative profit that is, firm 1 is able to cover its costs (including the fixed cost of the 
USO) with its receipts from E2E mails and from access. This zero profit constraint is:  
 
(1)  0)()()( 21111111111 ≥−−++−++−=Π Fxdxdcpxdcp uuurrruuua α  
 
Firm 2 sells its mail product at marginal cost and charges a price equal to:  
 
(2) 0222 =Π⇒+= uu cp α  
 
The regulator’s objective is to find the stamp prices for the incumbent and the access 
price that maximize the welfare subject to the constraint (1). We denote by λ  the Lagrange 
multiplier of the zero profit constraint for firm 1. (2) implies that the derivative of the 
demand kix  with respect to 
uα is equal to the derivative of kix  with respect to up2 . The 
first-order conditions to this problem read as follows:  
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8 This assumption is identical to the assumption on the behavior of the competitive fringe in contestable 
markets (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). 
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This type of first-order conditions is standard in efficient access pricing problems (see, 
for example, De Donder, 2006). Rearranging the terms in the first-order conditions, we can 
express the prices as the sum of three terms: price = marginal cost + a Ramsey term + a 
displacement term. That is:  
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where u2η  is the price elasticity of urban mail of firm 2 (in absolute value) and ]1,0[∈uσ  is 
the displacement ratio: uu
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u
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/
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Similarly, the stamp prices for the incumbent’s mails are: 
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where k1η is the price elasticity of mails sent to region k by firm 1 and ]1,0[~ ∈uσ  and 
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Solving this system, the efficient prices can be expressed as:  
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where uru
urruur
r
11
1111
1ˆ ηη
ηηηηη +
−=  and 01 <rγ .  
To start the discussion of these optimal prices, it is convenient to recall that, in the 
absence of competition, the optimal stamp price in region k would be set at a level such 
that kk
kk
p
dcp
11
111
ˆ
1
1 ηλ
λ
+=
−− . In other words, the optimal prices for a monopolist are 
inversely related to the so-called super-elasticities of its products.9 Because urban and rural 
mails are complements, we have kk 11ˆ ηη >  for k=u,r. How are prices modified with the 
presence of a competitor buying access? There are two main modifications. First, if entry 
is not neutral with respect to the incumbent’s profit, that is, if the access receipts less than 
compensate the lost receipts from the customers, there is an overall increase in prices. This 
change is captured by an increase in the value of the Lagrange multiplier λ . Second, the 
tariff is rebalanced. This change is captured by the “γ ” terms in the above expressions. 
This “γ ” term is positive in the urban market and negative in the rural market. The 
displacement ratios explain these modifications in the prices.10 In the sequel, we denote by 
kap1 , k=u,r and 
*α , the optimal prices that the regulator applies if the entrant buys access.  
3.2 Bypass 
Now suppose that firm 2 bypasses the incumbent’s delivery network. The regulator selects 
the prices kp1  in order to maximize:  
 
FxdcxdcxdcxxxUW uurruuurub −+−+−+−= 222111111211 )()()(),,(  
 
subject to:  
 
(11) 0)()( 111111111 ≥−+−++−=Π Fxdcpxdcp rrruuub  
 
Firm 2 sells its mail product at marginal cost which leads to:  
 
(12) 02222 =Π⇒+= uu dcp  
 
In the case of bypass, there is (by definition) no access receipts and therefore the value 
of uα  is not meaningful in this case. The first order conditions can be expressed as:  
 
(13) urrru
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λ )(
1 1111
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9 Super-elasticities were introduced by Rohlfs (1979). Their importance for access pricing in network 
industries has been emphasized by Laffont and Tirole (1994, 2000). 
10 See Billette de Villemeur et al (2007) for a related discussion. 
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Given that the incumbent does not collect any access revenues, it must raise its stamp 
prices in order to satisfy the zero-profit condition. Hence, at least one of the optimal stamp 
prices must be higher under bypass than under access. Furthermore, the displacement term 
disappears in equation (13) defining the optimal urban stamp price. This suggests that the 
relative price of urban mail with respect to rural mail is lower under bypass than under 
access, reflecting increased competition on the urban market. 
Solving the system, the prices can be inversely related to the superelasticity of the 
products:  
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Under bypass, the price structure is similar to that of monopoly prices but the overall 
level of prices is higher since the firm faces a stronger financial constraint. The firm needs 
to raise its prices to compensate for the lost receipts on the urban market due to the 
presence of the competitor. Under bypass, it is possible that the incumbent does not 
manage to break even. If the entrant’s price is low enough and it captures large mail 
volumes on the urban market, the incumbent may find it impossible to break even, and a 
graveyard spiral takes place.11 In this case, it may become impossible to sustain the USO. 
In the sequel, we denote the prices under bypass by kbp1 , k=u,r.  
3.3 Access vs. bypass 
We now compare welfare under bypass and access, Wa and Wb when the regulator controls 
the delivery decision of the entrant. The regulator can effectively exercise this control by 
putting restrictions on the license granted to the entrant. We establish that: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: There exists a cut-off point udd 1
* <  such that ba WW ≥  for all *2 dd u ≥ . 
 
Proof: We first show that ba WW ≥  for any uu dd 12 ≥  (with strict inequality if 
uu dd 12 > ). The argument is a revealed-preference argument. In a model with access, the 
regulator could replicate the bypass prices by setting uu d2=α , rbraubua pppp 1111  , == . This 
would result in a welfare level 
a
W . As long as uu dd 12 ≥ , ba WW ≥ . Furthermore, as 
ud1≥α , .0)( 12111 =Π≥−+Π=Π buuuba xdα  So the choice uu d2=α , rbraubua pppp 1111  , ==  is 
a feasible choice for the regulator. Hence b
aa WWW ≥≥ . 
Suppose uu dd 12 = . We can still show that ba WW ≥ . The argument is that the optimal 
choice of uα  must involve ud1* ≥α  (see the equation characterizing the optimal choice of 
                                                 
11 See Crew and Kleindorfer (2005). 
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α ). Intuitively, the regulator prefers that the incumbent make a positive profit on the 
market where prices are not distorted, rather than raise prices to make sure that the profit 
constraint is satisfied. As aW  and bW  are continuous functions of ud2  and 
ud1 , this shows 
that there exists 0>ε  such that ba WW ≥  for all ε−≥ uu dd 21 .■ 
This proposition shows that as long as the entrant’s marginal cost of delivery is higher 
than the incumbent’s marginal cost of delivery in the urban area, access is the efficient 
(welfare maximizing) delivery method. If the two firms have identical delivery costs, the 
regulator still prefers access to bypass, since it raises money to finance the USO with 
access but not with bypass. By continuity of the welfare functions, this must also hold 
for ε−≥ uu dd 21 . Hence, we observe that there exists a range of delivery costs for the 
entrant where the delivery cost of the entrant is smaller than that of the incumbent 
( uu dd 12 < ), but the regulator would prefer that the entrant buy access from the 
technologically inefficient operator.  
Some remarks are in order. First, a key assumption for proposition 1 is that the quality 
of the entrant’s product is independent of the delivery technology. The two firms sell 
different products but the entrant sells the same product using the two delivery methods. In 
other words, it is assumed that the entrant cannot increase its product quality by controlling 
the whole supply chain. Of course, if it was not the case, the welfare under bypass would 
be higher and the parameter space under which bypass is efficient would increase. Second, 
we take for granted that the USO is financed by the USP’s profits and the access receipts. 
We neglect other financing methods like the compensation fund (a method that is explicitly 
provided in French postal law but not yet used).12 Third, we implicitly assume that 
upstream competition is welfare enhancing. This is in fact the case if the entrant’s product 
is sufficiently differentiated and/or the upstream cost c2 is not too great compared to c1.  
Notice that Proposition 1 is silent on the relation between the welfare obtained under 
access and bypass when the delivery cost of the entrant is below d*. Intuitively, one would 
expect that bypass is preferred to access when the technological advantage of the entrant 
(measured by the difference uu dd 21 − ) is high. This is not necessarily the case, because 
bypass would then induce a very low price up2 , hence a high level of competition in the 
urban market which may prevent the operator from recovering its cost. Hence, the 
regulator may prefer to force access even though delivery costs of the entrant are very low, 
in order to guarantee nonnegative profits to the USP. We illustrate this with the following 
example: 
 
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that there only two urban markets, with utility 
21
2
2
2
12121 )(2
1)(
2
1),( xxxxxxxxU β−−−+= . Let the upstream costs be given by c1= 
c2=0, the downstream costs be given by d1 and d2.  
 
Under access, it is easy to see that the optimal prices are given by  
                                                 
12 Finland and Italy both rely on a compensation fund to partially finance the USO in a competitive market. 
However, in Finland, the level of the compensation fund tax has been so high as to prevent the entry of 
competitors. In Italy, hardly any taxes have been collected under the compensation fund even though they 
are legally required. (See the recent report by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2006) on entry in the postal 
industry in Europe.) 
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Under bypass, the optimal price is given by 
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The next graph plots the welfare levels under access and bypass, Wa and Wb as a 
function of the delivery cost of the entrant, d2 for β =1/2, d1=1/2 and F=1/100. 
 
 
Figure 1: Welfare levels under access and bypass 
The dashed line corresponds to welfare under access. This is independent of the 
delivery cost of the entrant, and under our parameter values, the incumbent can always 
cover the fixed cost under access. The solid line corresponds to welfare under bypass.13 It 
is easy to check that if d2<0.3464, the incumbent cannot cover his fixed cost, so bypass 
becomes infeasible. However, bypass is the preferred delivery method for any value 
0.3464≤ d2<0.498, and access is again preferred for d2≥0.498. 
3.4 Constrained access  
We now turn to the key issue of the paper. Suppose that the regulator cannot choose the 
delivery method of the entrant, but is constrained by the decision of the entrant. In that 
case, firm 2 chooses access whenever ud2
* ≤α . Consequently, for all the values of 
],[ **2 αdd u ∈ , the firm chooses bypass while access is socially preferred. This impact of 
prices on the delivery method should be incorporated in the design of the optimal prices. In 
the next subsection, we derive a constrained access solution where the regulator induces 
the cost-minimizing decision. In the constrained access case, the regulator maximizes the 
                                                 
13 In this simple example, welfare under bypass is monotonically decreasing in d2. However, this need not be 
the case in general. 
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welfare Wa under the additional constraint that uu d2≤α . This constraint aims at inducing 
an efficient technological choice by firm 2. When this constraint binds, the efficient stamp 
prices for the incumbent operator are: 
 
(16) uuuuu
uu
dd
p
dcp
112
11
111 ~)(
ˆ
1
1
γηλ
λ −++=
−−  
(17) ruurr
rr
dd
p
dcp
112
11
111 ~)(
ˆ
1
1
γηλ
λ −++=
−−  
 
with 0~1 >uγ and 0~1 <rγ . 
The structure of price under constrained access is similar to the structure under access. 
The main difference is that the “γ~ ” terms are weighted by the difference in the marginal 
costs of delivery. Hence, when the delivery cost of the entrant decreases, the urban price 
decreases while the rural price increases. We now consider under which conditions the 
regulator chooses access and bypass on the market. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: When the entrant is free to choose whether or not to bypass, the efficient 
delivery method is access for uu dd 21 ≤ and bypass for uu dd 21 ≥ . 
 
Proof: (1) For uu dd 21 ≤ , by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, the 
regulator could choose to set the access price so that uu d2=α  and obtain the level of 
welfare b
a
WW ≥ . By a revealed preference argument, the regulator always prefers access 
to bypass. 
(2) For uu dd 21 ≥ , we will show that ab WW ≥  (with strict inequality if uu dd 21 > ), so 
that the regulator prefers bypass to access. Consider the optimal choice of prices under 
access, and let rarbuaub pppp 1111  , == . Notice that 2222 ccdp uuu +=+= α  both under bypass 
and access. Let 
b
W  be the welfare value of bypass under these prices. Because uu dd 12 ≤ , 
ba WW ≤ . Now, notice that 0)( 122111 =Π≥−+Π=Π auuuab xdd , so these prices are feasible 
in the case of bypass. Again, by a revealed preference argument, we have: a
bb WWW ≥≥ . 
Notice that, if uu dd 12 = , then ba WW = . In fact, if uu dd 12 = , the optimal choices of 
up1 and 
rp1  are the same under access and bypass, because the two problems faced by the 
regulator are exactly identical.■ 
This shows that the regulator will always promote bypass if uu dd 12 ≤  and access if 
uu dd 12 ≥ . This is the technologically efficient choice, but it is not welfare maximizing. If 
he could, the regulator would like to favor access for some values such that uu dd 12 ≤ . On 
the other hand, the regulator will never want to favor bypass for some values such that 
uu dd 12 ≥ . So there might be excess bypass, but there will never be excess access.  
This proposition shows that, if the entrant can freely choose his delivery method, he 
will base his decision on the comparison between marginal costs of delivery, not taking 
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into account the USO of the incumbent. This will result in excess bypass, and in a lower 
level of welfare than when the regulator can choose the delivery method of the entrant. 
This welfare loss will not arise when the delivery cost of the entrant is high (namely, when 
*
2 α≥ud ). If *21 α<≤ uu dd , the regulator will be forced to lower his access price below the 
second-best level (from *α to ud 2 ). If uu ddd 12* <≤ , the regulator will have to accept 
bypass whereas she would have preferred access. Finally, for low values of ud 2  for which 
bypass is optimal and feasible, there is no welfare loss, as bypass is always preferred by 
the regulator. We summarize this discussion with the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 2: Constrained access and optimal delivery method 
EXAMPLE 2: Example 1 continued. 
We now compare welfare when the regulator can choose the delivery method and faces 
constrained access. The following graph shows the value of welfare for the same parameter 
values as in Example 1. We focus on the region of delivery costs of the entrant where the 
two welfare levels are different. 
 
 
Figure 3: Welfare levels under access, constrained access and bypass 
The solid line denotes welfare when the entrant chooses the delivery method and the 
dashed line welfare under access when the regulator chooses the delivery method. It 
appears that most of the welfare loss occurs when the two delivery costs are very close. For 
0.498≤ ud2  ≤0.5, the welfare loss is due to the fact that the regulator faces bypass and 
prefers access ( ab WW ≤ ); for 0.5≤ ud2 ≤0.515, the welfare loss ( aa WW ≤ ) is due to the 
fact that the regulator must charge an access price ud2=α  which is below the optimal 
access charge.  
ud 2ud1
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Bypass optimal 
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In this section, we have shown that the socially efficient delivery method does not 
coincide with the technologically efficient one. If the regulator selects the optimal (or 
Ramsey) prices, ignoring the impact of prices on the delivery choice, there is too much 
bypass from both a social and technological point of view. Once the regulator takes into 
account the impact of the access price on the access vs. bypass decision of the entrant, it 
implements a cost minimizing delivery method but there is still too much bypass with 
respect to the welfare maximizing outcome. 
4 Extensions 
4.1 Uniform tariff 
In the postal sector, a geographically uniform tariff is often imposed as part of the 
universal service obligations. When a unique stamp price p1 is applied for urban and rural 
mails, urban mails are relatively more expensive while rural mails are relatively less 
expensive: ru ppp 111 ≤≤ .  
What are the consequences of the uniform tariff on the access vs. bypass decision of 
the entrant? A higher urban price means that with a given price up2 , the entrant is able to 
capture a larger fraction of the incumbent’s customers. As a consequence, the USP has 
lower receipts from its urban mail. To compensate, the entrant should contribute more to 
the USO financing. That is, the access price must increase. If we take the first-order 
condition of the maximization of Wa, when a uniform tariff is imposed (6) must be 
replaced by: 
(18) 44 344 21
nt termdisplacemehigher 
111
2
2
1 )(1
uu
u
u
uu dcp
p
d σηλ
λα −−+++=  
 
In this expression, it is clear that the displacement term is higher when a uniform tariff 
is imposed. And therefore, the optimal access price *α  increases when the firm cannot 
price discriminate between its rural and its urban mail. But, since firm 2 chooses to bypass 
whenever *2 α≤ud , an increase in the access price implies that the set of parameters under 
which the entrant has incentives to bypass is larger. In other words, this means that if the 
regulator wants to implement an efficient technological choice by the entrant, the 
constrained access solution applies for a larger set of parameters under a uniform tariff. 
This is represented in figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Efficient access vs bypass choice in the uniform and the non-uniform tariff 
case 
By using the same argument as in proposition 2, we can show that the efficient delivery 
method is the cost-minimizing one: bypass for uu dd 12 <  and access otherwise. 
The uniform tariff is by itself a source of reduction in the welfare. But when the entry 
mode is taken as endogenous, constrained access should be applied for a larger set of 
parameters. Hence there is an additional welfare loss associated with a geographically 
uniform tariff: whenever the entrant’s delivery cost lies in ],[ *1 αud , the welfare is 
a
W which is lower than the welfare with unconstrained access Wa. 
4.2 Uncertainty  
We now investigate the consequences of technological uncertainty on the optimal prices 
and the induced choice of delivery by the entrant. This part of the paper is motivated by the 
facts that (1) competition in the delivery activity is still at its infancy and (2) the business 
model of the entrant is different from the incumbent’s. Therefore, the regulator may have 
incomplete information on the entrant’s precise delivery cost and we show in this section 
that this lack of information could be a source of inefficient bypass by the entrant.  
More precisely, we consider the following problem: firm 2, the entrant, is characterized 
by a delivery cost ud2 , which is private information to the firm. However, the distribution 
of this cost is common knowledge. In particular, we assume that it is commonly known 
that ud2  is distributed according to a continuous density function g(.) over the interval 
],[ 22
uu dd and 0)( >τg  for all τ in the interval.  
The regulator sets the incumbent’s prices ignoring the true value of ud2 . Firm 2 
observes these prices and decides whether it enters the market with its own delivery 
network or with access. Then, it sets its price at the corresponding competitive level. We 
concentrate on the cases where the incumbent’s prices cannot be contingent on the realized 
value of ud2 .
14  
The uncertainty on the technology of the entrant translates into an uncertainty on the 
choice of the delivery method. The key issue in this problem is that the access price uα  
                                                 
14 We do not treat the problem as a mechanism design problem where the regulator offers a menu of prices 
contingent on the revealed value of the delivery cost. If this mechanism is incentive compatible, the firm 
truthfully reveals its cost. Instead, we assume that the regulator is bound to use flat stamp and access prices. 
This could be viewed as an application of the non-discrimination principle imposed by the European 
directives regarding the organization of the postal sector. 
ud1
*α
*α ud 2
Constrained access 
Constrained access 
Uniform tariff 
Non-uniform tariff 
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determines the probabilities of access and bypass. In particular, for any ],[ 22
uuu dd∈α , 
there is a probability )( uG α  that firm 2 builds up its own delivery network and a 
probability )(1 uG α−  that it uses the incumbent’s network, where G(.) is the distribution 
function associated with g(.): ∫= xd u dgxG   2 )()( ττ . 
The regulatory problem with unknown cost is then:  
 
∫ ∫+= uu
u
uuru
d ab
pp
dgWdgWMax
α
αα
ττττ 
d 
 
 ,, 2
2
11
)()(Wˆ   
 
subject to the zero profit constraint for firm 1: 
 
∫ ∫ ≥Π+Π=Π uu
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u
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 111 2
2
0)()(  
 
Wˆ is the expected welfare when the entrant’s cost is unknown. It is composed of two 
terms: the first term is the expected welfare under bypass (the entrant’s cost is in 
],[ 2
uud α ); the second term is the welfare under access (the entrant’s cost is in ],[ 2uu dα ). 
Similarly, the profit of firm 1 is the sum of the expected profit under access and the 
expected profit under bypass.  
We will consider the case in which *21 α<≤ uu dd . That is the case in which under full 
information the regulator always prefers access. Moreover, to induce this choice under 
symmetric information, the regulator must apply the constrained access solution for 
*
2 α≤ud .  
We now derive a sufficient condition under which uu d 2=α  is not optimal, that is, there 
exist realizations of the cost for which bypass is chosen. To this end, we denote by up
1
 and 
rp
1
 the price that a regulator would apply if it wants to induce access when it faces an 
entrant with a known delivery cost of ud 2 . Since 
*
2 α≤ud , these prices are given by 
equations (16) and (17). We check that >=< uuru dpp 211 ,, α  is not a solution to our 
problem.  
In this problem, the regulator faces a trade-off between promoting the efficient delivery 
technology which requires a low access price and raising funds from the entrant to finance 
the cost of the USO which requires instead a high access charge. We show that there are 
circumstances under which the regulator induces “too much” bypass to increase the 
financial contribution of firm 2 in the case of access. Allowing for inefficient bypass is a 
way to increase the expected financial contribution of the entrant to the USO. Under 
asymmetric information, the regulator trades off the contribution of the entrant to the USO 
financing and the efficient delivery method.  
Let us define Δ  as the value of u
aaW
α
λ
∂
Π+∂ )( 1  evaluated at the proposed solution 
>=< uuru dpp 211 ,, α . 
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We can show that:  
PROPOSITION 3: When, under symmetric information, access is efficient for all possible 
realizations of ud2 , 
uu dd 12 ≥ ; there is a positive probability of bypass under asymmetric 
information ( uu d 2>α ) if: (1) uu dd 2*2 << α  and (2) ))(( 1222 uuuu dddgx −≥Δ . 
 
Proof: See appendix.■ 
 
This proposition demonstrates that whenever access is the socially preferred delivery 
method for all possible realizations of the cost parameter of the entrant, the regulator may 
nevertheless select an access price that induces a positive probability of bypass. The reason 
is that promoting access in all possible circumstances is costly because the regulator must 
set the access price at the lowest possible level. Then, the regulator allows some bypass to 
increase the expected access receipts when the firm chooses access. There is a trade-off 
between an efficient market structure and the USO financing. Uncertainty about the 
entrant’s cost is then a source of excess bypass.  
Gautier and Mitra (2008) have a similar result in a context where an entrant with 
unknown cost decides between access and no entry. They show that allowing for an 
inefficient market structure ex-post (in their case, a low probability of entry) is a way to 
increase the financial contribution of the entrant to the infrastructure financing.  
If we have a closer look at the condition that guarantees a positive probability of 
bypass, we can establish that this condition is more likely to be met when the gap between 
the lowest possible delivery cost of the entrant and the incumbent’s marginal delivery cost 
)( 12
uu dd −  is small. The reason is that the left hand side (Δ ) decreases in )( 12 uu dd −  while 
the right hand side increases in this difference. And, when uu dd 12 = , there is, for sure, a 
positive probability of bypass. 
5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal prices chosen by a regulator in the face of 
entry in the postal sector. We have emphasized that the entrant can choose between two 
business models: access and bypass, and that the regulator must take this choice into 
account when computing its optimal prices. If the regulator can control the entrant’s 
choice, he will induce access even when the entrant has a lower delivery cost than the 
incumbent. If the regulator cannot control the entrant’s choice, prices will be chosen so 
that the entrant prefers to bypass when his delivery cost is lower than the incumbent’s, 
bypass will occur too often, and the USP may be unable to sustain his obligations. The 
prices that lead to this cost-minimizing outcome are contingent on the delivery cost of the 
entrant. When the cost of the entrant is unknown, the regulator trades off the probability of 
bypass with the expected access receipts, and may reduce his access price even more to 
prevent excessive bypass under uncertainty.  
In conclusion, we would like to discuss the welfare implications of the different modes 
of competition. Competition in the upstream segments of the market (access) is a good 
thing as long as the entrant offers a differentiated product and/or competition decreases the 
upstream cost. The case of competing networks (bypass) is more complicated. Bypass 
raises welfare only when the entrant cost advantage is high enough, but in some 
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circumstances, maintaining the USO is not always possible. Preventing bypass with lower 
access price is not always the solution and it is costly in terms of welfare. Uncertainty 
leads to excess bypass. And, when access is bought by both competitors and postal 
customers (usually at the same price), reducing the access price has a more important 
impact on the receipts of the incumbent.  
There are other regulatory options that we did not consider in this paper. First, the 
scope of the USO could be changed. If F decreases, the margin on all the products 
decreases and it therefore lowers the incentives to bypass. Reducing the scope of the USO 
is likely to reduce welfare, but it must be compared with the welfare loss associated with 
the pricing methods to deter bypass. Second, in the US, the incumbent’s monopoly 
position on the last mail delivery is maintained and it is a radical solution to prevent 
efficient and inefficient bypass. But, it does not give incentives to the incumbent for 
adopting a more efficient delivery technology unless it has the option to sub-contract 
delivery (see Panzar, 2005 for a detailed analysis of competition for delivery). Finally, 
Armstrong (2001) proposes to set up a compensation fund by selling access at marginal 
cost and applying an output tax t to the competitor, irrespective of its delivery method. 
This is a way to achieve the cost-minimizing outcome and to attain welfare level Wa if 
udt 1
* −= α  under access. However, an output tax and a compensation fund for the USO 
are not easily implemented in the postal sector.  
6 References 
Armstrong, M. (2001) “Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service,” American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91: 297-301. 
Armstrong, M., C. Doyle and J. Vickers (1996) “The Access Pricing Problem: A 
Synthesis,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 44: 131-150. 
Baumol, W., J. Panzar and R. Willig (1982) Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: New York. 
Billette de Villemeur, E., H. Cremer, B. Roy. and J. Toledano (2007) “Worksharing, 
Access and Bypass: the Structure of Prices in the Postal Sector,” Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 32: 67-85. 
Cazals, C., M. de Rycke, J.P. Florens and S. Rouzaud (1997) “Scales Economies and 
Natural Monopolies in the Postal Delivery,” in Crew and P. Kleindorfer (ed.), Managing 
Changes in the Postal and Delivery Industries, Kluwer Academic Press, Boston. 
Cremer, H., M. De Rycke and A. Grimaud (1997) “Costs and Benefits of Universal 
Service Obligations in the Postal Sector,” in Crew and P. Kleindorfer (ed.), Managing 
Changes in the Postal and Delivery Industries, Kluwer Academic Press: Boston. 
Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer (1992) The Economics of Postal Services. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers: Boston. 
Review of Network Economics                                    Vol.7, Issue 2 – June 2008 
 
 226
Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer (2005) “Competition, Universal Service and the Graveyard 
Spiral,” in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (ed.), Regulatory and Economics Changes in the 
Postal and Delivery Sector, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer (2006) “Welfare Effects of Entry and Strategies for 
Maintaining the USO,” in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (ed.), Progress Toward the 
Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, Springer, New York. 
Dam, K., A. Gautier, and M. Mitra (2007) “Efficient Access Pricing and Endogenous 
Market Structure,” CORE DP 2007/4, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
De Donder, P. (2006) “Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations,” 
Review of Industrial Organization, 28: 307-326. 
De Donder, P., H. Cremer, P. Dudley, and F. Rodriguez (2006) “Pricing and Welfare 
Implications of Alternative Approaches to Setting Price Controls in the Postal Sector,” in 
M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (ed.), Progress Toward the Liberalization of the Postal and 
Delivery Sector, Springer, New York. 
Gautier, A. and M. Mitra (2008) “Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility,” 
Economica, forthcoming.  
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1994) “Access Pricing and Competition,” European Economic 
Review, 38: 1673-1710. 
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (2000) Competition in Telecommunications. MIT Press: 
Cambridge and London. 
Panzar, J. (2005) “Combining Liberalization and Unbundling Policies in Postal Markets,” 
paper presented at the 13th CRRI conference on Postal and Delivery Economics. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2006) The Impact on Universal Service of the Full Market 
Accomplishment of the Postal Internal Market in 2009, report to the European 
Commission. 
Rohlfs, J. (1979) “Economically-efficient Bell System Pricing,” Bell Labs Discussion 
Paper 138. 
 
7 Appendix 
7.1 Derivation of the optimal prices  
Let us define the following 2x2 matrix A and the column vector b:  
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From these matrices, we define the 2x2 matrix Bi as the matrix A where its ith column is 
replaced by the vector b.  
The solutions of the equation system  
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To derive these expressions, we made the hypothesis that urru dpdxdpdx 1111 // = . 
7.1.1 Access 
Under access, the first-order conditions of the welfare maximization problem can be 
expressed as:  
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The solution is:  
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7.1.2 Bypass 
Under bypass, the first-order conditions of the welfare maximization problem can be 
expressed as:  
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its price at marginal cost: uu dcp 222 += and the access price is set at a level that induces 
bypass: uu d2≥α . 
7.1.3 Constrained access 
Under constrained access, we have uu d2=α . The first-order conditions of the welfare 
maximization problem can be expressed as:  
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7.2 Proof of proposition 3 
 
Integrating by parts, the regulator’s objective function can be expressed as:  
 
Γ−−+−Π+≡ uuuuaa
pp
xdGWMax
uru 211,,
))(()1(Wˆ  
11
ααλλ
α
, 
 
where τλτα d
dd
WG
u
ud u
b
u
b∫ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
Π∂+∂
∂=Γ  
 
2
1
22
)( . 
 
This objective function is the sum of three terms. The first one is equivalent to the 
objective function of the regulator under access. It is what the regulator can achieve when 
it does not allow bypass ( uu d 2=α ). The other two terms measure the impact of allowing 
bypass with a positive probability. The second term is the expected loss of access receipts. 
This has an impact on both the welfare and the profit and it therefore explains why it is 
multiplied by )1( λ+ .15 The third term Γ captures the impact on the welfare and the profit 
of having a more efficient entrant that is, an entrant with a lower delivery cost ud 2 . The 
entrant’s delivery cost does not affect the welfare and the profit under access 
since 22 cp
uu += α , but it affects them under bypass since 222 cdp uu += . Γ  then measures 
the impact of a change in ud2  and therefore of a change in 
up2  on the objective function. 
 
The first-order conditions of the above problem are:  
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15 By integrating by parts, the expected delivery cost of the entrant evaluated at the upper bound of the 
integral ( uud α=2 ) is uuG αα )( . In order to isolate in the objective function the expression Wa, we 
express this expected delivery cost as the sum of the expected cost under access uu dG 1)(α  plus 
))(( 1
uuu dG −αα . 
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with the derivatives of aaW 1Π+ λ  given by (3), (4) and (5). 
We now derive a condition under which >=< uuru dpp 211 ,, α is not a solution to the 
above problem. If uu d 2=α , we have 0)( =uG α  and then, for k=u,r: 0
1
=∂
Γ∂
kp
 and 
0=∂
Γ∂
α . Then, by construction (19) and (20) are both equal to zero. Then, if evaluated at 
the proposed solution, (21) is positive, the regulator increases the welfare by increasing uα  
and the proposed solution is not valid. Because ud 2  is smaller than 
*α , we have that 
evaluated at the proposed solution 0)( 1 >∂
Π+∂=Δ u
aaW
α
λ . Then, a sufficient condition for 
having uu d 2≥α  is: 
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